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BOOK REVIEW 
STOCHASTIC CONSTRAINT 
POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY 
AFTER 9/II. By Jack Goldsmith. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co. 
2012. Pp. xvi, JII. $26.95· 
Reviewed by Neal Kumar Katyal* 
One hot summer day, following a week-long marathon of grading 
130 Constitutional Law exams, I received a visit from a student who 
appeared in my office to protest her grade vociferously. She arrived 
clutching the marked-up exam that she had written during the allo-
cated three hours. Her exam was four pages long. And she pointed to 
the last lines of the exam, and then pulled out a copy of the exam I 
had designated as the best in the class, and contended that she should 
have received the same grade. Her reasoning was simple: "I got the 
same answer, so I should get the same grade." I pointed out, however, 
that the model exam was a twenty-page-long exegesis of the same 
problem, and reached the same answer that she did by a completely 
different (and more accurate) path. In the end, I told her, a grade is 
not simply a function of the bottom-line answer, but rather of the 
process used to reach the result. 
With The Terror Presidency, 1 Professor Jack Goldsmith wrote, 
hands down, the very best analysis of the national security issues sur-
rounding President George W. Bush's tenure. In Power and Con-
straint: The Accountable Presidency After g/r I, Goldsmith returns to 
the same set of problems, but adopts a different tack. He argues that 
the modern wartime Executive is constrained in new ways beyond the 
traditional system of checks and balances, and that these new con-
straints combine to create an effective system that checks executive 
power. Though the modern wartime Executive may disregard tradi-
tional limits on presidential power and attempt to act unilaterally, new 
checks from an aggressive press, a watchful and technologically 
enabled public, and the legalization of warfare combine to constrain 
the executive branch. Goldsmith argues that this system is the type of 
reciprocal restraint of which our Founders would have approved (p. 
24J). 
* Paul and Patricia Saunders Professor of Law, Georgetown University. The author wishes to 
thank Aaron Pennekamp for excellent research assistance. 
I }ACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007). 
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Goldsmith's claim ultimately boils down to one about how presi-
dential constraint arises from a stochastic melange produced by these 
newly empowered actors. But in his analysis of the constraint imposed 
on the modern Executive by this new system of checks and balances, 
Goldsmith fails to account for the values served by good process. Just 
as with a student's four-page exam (which might reach a correct result 
but probably will not), the path by which the Executive is constrained 
matters, because it will significantly affect the substantive quality and 
sustainability of that end result. Goldsmith's new system of account-
ability relies on a combination of government leaks and self-checking 
out of fear of reprisal, whereas the traditional system trusts 
"[a]mbition ... to counteract ambition."2 The latter system- the one 
envisioned by the Founders - has significantly fewer side effects at-
tached to the process of checking the Executive. 
In this Review, I argue that the particular process employed to con-
strain the Executive has consequences beyond the mere fact of achiev-
ing some level of constraint, and the "new" system of checks and bal-
ances has more costs associated with it than the traditional, 
constitutionally envisioned system, which primarily relies on govern-
ment officials. In the end, many different methods might be used to 
achieve "constraint," broadly conceived, but the process chosen to 
reach that constraint has substantive implications. Part I discusses the 
relationship between the process used to check the Executive and the 
substance of the constraints imposed. It contends that, just as the 
Coase Theorem predicts, the initial set of entitlements will strongly in-
fluence the eventual result, and that Coasean analysis provides a help-
ful frame through which to assess Goldsmith's claim that the new con-
straints he identifies can substitute for Madisonian checks and 
balances. Part II analyzes Goldsmith's speculation that the modern 
cycle of permission and constraint is likely to continue, and suggests 
that future inquiry should examine whether particular policy solutions 
could be developed, in advance of the next crisis, that might break this 
cycle. 
I. HOW PROCESS INFLUENCES SUBSTANCE 
The standard separation of powers story is simple: our Founders 
divided government power, both horizontally and vertically, to prevent 
any one institution from becoming too powerful. Madison, in The 
Federalist No. sr, described the government as one in which: 
[I]ts several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means 
of keeping each other in their proper places .... [T]he great security 
against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same depart-
2 THE FEDERALIST No.5 1, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
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ment consists in giving to those who administer each department the nec-
essary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments 
of the others .... Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.3 
Faced with undoubted evidence that Presidents have sought to 
maximize their powers in the national security realm at the expense of 
Congress, Goldsmith says not to worry. His book argues that the 
modern system of aggressive journalism, leaks, and information-
sharing technology (pp. xiv-xv) as accountability mechanisms is a 
"harmonious system of mutual frustration" of the sort Madison envi-
sioned (p. 243). Goldsmith here is partially correct: the ex post scruti-
ny he celebrates truly is a check on executive power, but it is not at all 
the type of ex ante constraint the Founders envisioned. Acting first, 
and then calibrating policy to adjust ex post to the reaction of courts 
as well as the media and other extragovernmental entities is a far cry 
from Madison's constraints - particularly in a world in which Presi-
dents possess massive powers (such as the ability to deploy over-
whelming military might at a moment's notice and to manipulate dip-
lomatic and economic levers) that are unlike any tools possessed by 
any leader in the history of the world. 
A. The Obama Continuation of Bush-Era Policies 
Goldsmith chronicles the narrative of counterterrorism policy 
through the transition from the Bush Administration to the Obama 
Administration. He notes that, contrary to what many might have ex-
pected before President Obama took office, the Obama Administration 
has largely embraced the Bush Administration's counterterrorism poli-
cies (p. x). He acknowledges that there were significant changes in in-
terrogation policy and minor changes to rendition policy and detention 
criteria, but by and large, he contends, the policies remained in place 
(pp. 5-20). 
Goldsmith's explanation for this continuation mentions several fac-
tors, including the tendency of Presidents to adopt institutional view-
points after inauguration (pp. 28-29) and the public's increased wil-
lingness to accept aggressive policies from a seemingly pacifist 
President (p. 40). But the factor with the most explanatory power -
and one that Goldsmith does not quite acknowledge - is the fact that 
by the time the Obama Administration took office, both Congress and 
the judicial branch had already rigorously vetted the Bush Adminis-
tration's policies and reined in many of its extravagant excesses. By 
January 2009, many of the existing policies reflected something closer 
to a consensus than the discord that had characterized the middle of 
the Bush presidency. Accordingly, the Obama Administration contin-
J Jd. at 318-I9. 
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ued to perpetuate Bush-era policies, but they were policies that had 
been approved by Congress, the courts, and the press. 
This last factor is where substance and process enter the equation. 
The policies the Obama Administration inherited were significantly 
different from the ones President Bush first proposed, both substan-
tively and procedurally. For example, the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 4 provided unprecedented protections to detainees in response to 
scandals at Abu Ghraib and other problems. In addition, the Military 
Commissions Act of 20065 provided a series of statutory protections 
and legislative specifications of crimes that were completely absent 
from President Bush's unilateral military order to set up the Guanta-
namo tribunals. And, as the titles of both of these examples reveal, 
they were Acts of Congress, not executive decrees. Before these Acts, 
the Bush Administration had contended that it was the stroke of one 
man's pen that could change the legal status quo - even sometimes 
when Congress had directly spoken to the issue. The Bush Adminis-
tration had begun its defense of some of its most significant post-9/rr 
policies by claiming that the Commander in Chief Clause of the Con-
stitution permitted unilateral presidential action, and in some cases 
(such as electronic surveillance and torture) even going so far as to 
suggest that the President's Article II powers would trump duly 
enacted statutes of Congress that forbade presidential action in the 
area.6 This assertion under the third category of Justice Jackson's 
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,? however, lost 
force over time. Goldsmith acknowledges the change in constitutional 
law (pp. 187-88), but does not give it its due. This omission is one ex-
ample of a larger concern with Goldsmith's thesis: his slighting of the 
role process plays in checking the Executive. 
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2ooodd-2ooodd-x (2oo6). 
5 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 26oo (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of ro, 
r8, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
6 For a discussion of electronic surveillance, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHOR-
ITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED 
BY THE PRESIDENT 33-44 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opalwhitepaperonnsalegal 
authorities.pdf. For a discussion of defenses of executive use of torture in violation of the relevant 
statute, see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Al-
berto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. x, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS 172, 207-
I3 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
7 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Jackson's famous concurrence grouped presidential actions into 
three categories - when the President acts with explicit congressional backing, when the Presi-
dent acts in the absence of congressional expression, and when the President acts contrary to "the 
expressed or implied will of Congress," id. at 637 Oackson, J., concurring)- concluding that in 
the third category the President's "power is at its lowest ebb," id. See id. at 635-38. 
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B. Ex Post Versus Ex Ante Checks and Balances 
The early Bush-era policies were formulated unilaterally, in a man-
ner that cut out the other two branches of government; yet by the time 
the Obama Administration inherited the policies, they had been 
scrubbed by the courts and by Congress. A hard question is whether 
the way in which those policies were formulated matters. Are we 
living in the world of Justice White's INS v. Chadha8 dissent, where 
so long as a functional constraint on the Executive exists, the legal 
niceties do not matter - so much so that the President can exercise his 
"veto" power before legislation is even taken up by Congress?9 Or 
does formalism serve important values that cannot truly be replaced 
by Goldsmith's newfangled checks and balances? Goldsmith argues 
that even as Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
and as the Supreme Court issued the Boumediene v. Bush 10 opinion, 
the other branches were confirming the Executive's exercise of power 
while they were amending it around the edges (pp. 197-99). By offer-
ing moderate changes, the other branches confirmed generally the Ex-
ecutive's power to act. Are these actions not checks and balances in 
substance, if not in form? 
Perhaps. Goldsmith is right to say that Congress and the judiciary 
may place limits on executive power through these mechanisms. But 
the ex post nature of these powers gives the Executive a huge first-
mover advantage: the potential scope of executive power as asserted 
by the President is limited only by his boldness. With little initial 
check on what power can be asserted, the range of acceptable exercises 
of power may shift past what would have otherwise been acceptable. 
"Go ahead, I dare you" is not a stable edifice for constitutional law in 
general. And this point has particular resonance in the realm of na-
tional security. Presidents have to act quickly, and Congress, by its na-
ture, has little choice but to trust the Executive more than it does in 
8 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
9 In his Chadha dissent, Justice White argued that the "central concern" of the Founders was 
that "departure[s] from the legal status quo" require the approval of the President and the majori-
ty of both houses, or two-thirds of both houses in the case of a presidential veto. I d. at 994 
(White, J., dissenting). The precise manner in which this approval was granted was of less con-
cern. Regarding the deportation matter at issue, Justice White argued: 
The President's approval is found in the Attorney General's action in recommending to 
Congress that the deportation order for a given alien be suspended. The House and the 
Senate indicate their approval of the Executive's action by not passing a resolution of 
disapproval within the statutory period. Thus, a change in the legal status quo - the 
deportability of the alien - is consummated only with the approval of each of the three 
relevant actors. 
/d. at 994-95. 
10 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2oo8). 
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the domestic sphere. 11 There are many reasons to think that Congress 
will not be able to complain - whether due to time constraints, poli-
tics, lack of access to real-time intelligence, or other factors. 
What is true for Congress is even more so for the courts. Courts 
lack daily intelligence briefings, trained foreign policy staff, experts 
who can detect the nuances in diplomacy, and the like. Due to their 
limited institutional competence in the national security realm, it is 
very hard to imagine them exercising much of a checking function. 
The post-g/r r cases are, in this sense, a historical anomaly - for al-
most all of American history it was extremely hard for the government 
to lose a war powers case in the Supreme Court during a time of 
armed conflict.U (It was kind of like failing a class at Yale- you re-
ally had to try.) But it is very difficult to envision courts in the future 
playing quite the same role as they have over the last decade. Indeed, 
the government-friendly post-Boumediene decisions by the D.C. Cir-
cuit, none of which has been taken up by the Supreme Court, are pow-
erful indicia of that fact. 13 
Goldsmith's description of public perception as a check on execu-
tive power suffers from the same problem. He observes that the man-
ner in which the public accepts the President's actions depends a great 
deal upon the public's opinion of the President himself (pp. 4 7-48). A 
President perceived as eager for battle will be more severely ques-
tioned when he sends troops into harm's way than a President per-
ceived as a pacifist. But this point undoes some of Goldsmith's own 
argument, for it means that public receptiveness to particular policies 
will turn on which President is proposing them. Popular perception of 
a President's agenda is not a stable edifice on which to build a serious 
check. Indeed, because public perception and congressional con-
straints are both muted by presidential popularity, there is a deep risk 
that a particularly popular President may work grave changes in the 
11 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 2, at 422-23 ("[P]oliticians 
and statesman ... have, with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualifica-
tion of [the Executive], and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single 
hand .... Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of 
one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number .... "). 
12 See ]OHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 67, 192 (1993) (providing examples). 
13 See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 20II) (vacating and remanding district 
court's decision to grant Guantanamo detainee's habeas petition), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2 741 
(2012); Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 20II) (reversing district court's decision to grant 
Guantanamo detainee's habeas petition), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 
613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing district court's decision to order release of Guantanamo 
detainee following detainee's habeas petition), cert. denied, 13 r S. Ct. 1001 (201 r); AI Maqaleh v. 
Gates, 6os F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing district court and holding that federal habeas juris-
diction does not extend to detainees held at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan); Al-Bihani v. 
Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming district court's denial of Guantanarno detainee's 
habeas petition), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
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framework of the law, and that those executive branch precedents will 
be used by later Presidents (akin to Justice Jackson's famous warning 
in his Korematsu v. United States dissent). 14 Our Founders placed in-
tensive checks and balances in the Constitution to avoid this precise 
problem. 15 It is not easy to imagine that those checks can be replaced 
by Goldsmith's newfangled ones without significant damage. 
C. Executive Constraint and Coasean Entitlements 
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama are not the first 
Presidents to claim and exercise extraordinary war powers, as 
Goldsmith documents. But several of our greatest Presidents took a 
different path even as they asserted great executive power. 
President Lincoln unilaterally suspended habeas corpus in r86r, 
but convened a special session of Congress to determine whether he 
was right to do so, and he assured Congress he would abide by its de-
cision.16 Similarly, in 1952, President Truman seized the nation's steel 
mills, but even as he did so, he sent a message to Congress asking 
them whether he was wrong to actY With many of the aforemen-
14 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, Justice Jackson stated: 
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military 
emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander may revoke it all. But 
once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Consti-
tution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions 
such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination 
in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies 
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a 
plausible claim of an urgent need. 
I d. at 246 Uackson, J., dissenting). 
IS See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 Games Madison), supra note 2, at 318-19. As James Madi-
son argued: 
I d. 
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same 
department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary 
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the oth-
ers ... supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives .... [T]he 
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each 
may be a check on the other - that the private interest of every individual may be a 
sentinel over the public rights. 
!6 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session Guly 4, r86r), in 6 COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 297, 310 Uohn G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1905); see also 
Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: 'Prying the Military 'lribunals, 
III YALE L.J. 1259, 1272-73, 1309 & n.r86 (2002). 
!7 The morning after directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel mills, President 
Truman sent the following message to Congress: 
[I]t was my judgment that Government operation of the steel mills for a temporary pe-
riod was the least undesirable of the courses of action which lay open. In the circum-
stances, I believed it to be, and now believe it to be, my duty and within my powers as 
President to follow that course of action. 
It may be that the Congress will deem some other course to be wiser .... 
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tioned Bush Administration policies, such as detainee treatment, mili-
tary commissions, or electronic surveillance, there was no such over-
ture to Congress in the first several years after g/n. This is not just a 
matter of interbranch etiquette - it is about stymieing checks and 
balances. One of the most endemic features of Congress is its inertia. 
And given that inertia, it is particularly important that a President 
jump-start a conversation about the propriety of an action when he 
acts unilaterally. By signaling that the President welcomes the discus-
sion, the Truman-Lincoln model facilitates the congressional checking 
function that Goldsmith celebrates. By contrast, presidential actions 
undertaken in secret cannot, by their nature, create the conditions for 
such a conversation. 
To understand why "act first, ask forgiveness later" yields a differ-
ent constitutional allocation of powers, insights derived from the Coase 
Theorem are particularly illuminating. Simply put, the Coase Theo-
rem states that in the absence of transaction costs, parties will bargain 
to the efficient allocation regardless of the initial distribution of re-
sources.18 It does not matter who has what resources or rights at the 
beginning; if bargaining costs nothing, at the end of the day, the par-
ties will reach the optimal result. This theorem has a long academic 
pedigree and broad applications, from environmental economics to ur-
ban planning. But in each real-world application, the crucial question 
revolves around transaction costs. If it is costly to bargain and trans-
fer resources or rights, then the initial allocation of those resources and 
rights has enormous consequences. 
One of Goldsmith's central claims is that the Executive will be 
constrained in wartime, regardless of whether those constraints take 
effect before or after the Executive has acted. This is, in essence, a 
Coasean claim - regardless of which actor moves first, we will end up 
at a place where the Executive is constrained. If Congress has the 
right to move first by setting policy, the President can veto it and so 
affect it; by contrast, if the President has the right to move first, Con-
gress, the media, and the judiciary can retroactively pass judgment on 
his actions. But, just as with any application of the Coase Theorem, 
Youngstown Sheet & Thbe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 676 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quot-
ing 98 CONG. REC. 3912 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1\velve days later, the President sent another message: "The Congress can, if it wishes, re-
ject the course of action I have followed in this matter." I d. at 677 (quoting 98 CONG. REC. 4131 
(1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Katyal & Tribe, supra note r6, at 1297, 1309 & 
n.186. 
18 "It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation 
of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights 
will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production." R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
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the transaction costs that accompany the bargaining process are what 
ultimately determine its success. 19 
So, for example, in urban planning, the first settlers often have 
powerful advantages. The status quo will not easily change for a new-
comer no matter what he offers; there is value in continuity beyond the 
mere costs of moving and construction. 20 A similar problem infects 
environmental economics: there are few rights granted to communities 
against polluters, and the obstacles to collective action prevent com-
munities from organizing effectively to offer a sum that incentivizes a 
polluting corporation to reduce its emissions. 
War powers are no different. There is a tremendous advantage to 
the first mover, and the transaction costs involved with checking an 
actor may be too great. If the President acts too boldly, Congress and 
the judiciary may not be able to constrain the President ex post.2 1 It 
may take years for Congress even to learn of the action, and by that 
point, the policy may be entrenched, making alteration bureaucratical-
ly complicated. Furthermore, there may be significant costs in the in-
terim before Goldsmith's ex post checks begin to rein in executive 
power. That is particularly true today, when Presidents possess un-
precedented powers, both military and diplomatic. 
The use of force has consistently been an unofficial presidential 
power, despite the Constitution's delegation of the declaration of war 
to Congress.22 Presidents as early as Jefferson eschewed congressional 
approval in troop deployment,Z3 and despite the War Powers Resolu-
tion of 1973,24 which attempted to limit the time troops may be de-
ployed without congressional approval to ninety days, 25 Presidents 
have continued to act unilaterally. President Reagan was sued twice 
19 "Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account ... the initial 
delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system 
operates." /d. at rs-r6. Thus, "we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the 
various social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a government depart-
ment)." !d. at 44· 
20 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes and Alternative 
Land Use Controls, 27 J. CORP. L. 519,529 (2002) (explaining that Coasean land controls make 
change extremely difficult because any change must be approved by unanimous consent of all 
landowners). 
21 Some of the new checks Goldsmith identifies, such as executive branch lawyering and in-
spectors general, function ex ante. But, as I discuss in Part II, Goldsmith himself acknowledges 
that these peacetime checks will be weak or suspended in times of crisis. See infra p. roos. And 
today, without significant reforms within the executive branch, these checks are unlikely to do the 
work the Founders envisioned. For an analysis of the reforms necessary to make these internal 
checks work, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, IIS YALE L.J. 2314 (2006). 
22 "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o declare War .... "U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, d. r r. 
23 See MartinS. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, ros YALE L.J. 1725, r8r8 (rgg6). 
24 so U.S.C. §§ I54I-IS48 (2006). 
25 fd. § 1544(b). 
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for violating the War Powers Resolution by supporting the government 
of El Salvador and the Nicaraguan Contras,26 fifty-four members of 
Congress sought an injunction against President George H.W. Bush to 
prevent Operation Desert Storm from commencing without congres-
sional approval,27 and President Clinton faced a lawsuit claiming the 
airstrikes during the Kosovo crisis violated the War Powers Resolu-
tion.28 Courts have routinely let such military operations stand, either 
by applying the political question doctrine or by dismissing the litiga-
tion for lack of standing. 29 The Executive therefore has been largely 
unconstrained by either the legislative or judicial branch when it 
comes to the use of force. 30 What makes things somewhat different 
today is the massive power that Presidents wield at a moment's notice. 
With over 1500 nuclear weapons at their disposal, not to mention lit-
erally millions of soldiers, Presidents can inflict massive, planet-level 
damage at the push of a button or through a short order to the mili-
tary. As Vice President Cheney put it most vividly: 
The president of the United States now for so years is followed at all 
times, 24 hours a day, by a military aide carrying a football that contains 
the nuclear codes that he would use and be authorized to use in the event 
of a nuclear attack on the United States. 
He could launch a kind of devastating attack the world's never seen. He 
doesn't have to check with anybody. He doesn't have to call the Con-
gress. He doesn't have to check with the courts. He has that authority 
because of the nature of the world we live in.31 
Presidents also wield considerable diplomatic tools,32 despite the 
academic debate concerning which branch is properly responsible for 
26 See]. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good For? War Power, Judicial Review, and Consti-
tutional Deliberation, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 685, 705-06 (2001). 
27 /d. at 706. 
28 I d. at 708. 
29 See id. at 705-10. 
30 The legality of the Bush Administration's exercise of war powers under the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (AUMF) is rigorously analyzed and defended in Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, rr8 HARV. L. REV. 
2047 (2005). 
31 Transcript: Vice President Cheney on "FOX News Sunday," FOX NEWS (Dec. 22, 2008), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/o,2933,4 707o6,oo.html (quoting Vice President Cheney). The Vice 
President continued: "No president has ever signed off on the proposition that the War Powers 
Act is constitutional. I would argue that it is, in fact, a violation of the Constitution, that it's an 
infringement on the president's authority as the commander in chief." /d. 
32 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Ex-
ecutive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1592-93 (2005) (arguing that the Vesting Clause 
properly places diplomatic authority in the executive branch); Phillip R. Trimble, The President's 
Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 755 (1989) ("[T]he President has the exclusive 
power of official communication with foreign governments.'). 
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foreign affairs.33 The modern President often acts alone in forging in-
ternational agreements,34 either through "sole executive agreements," 
which the President negotiates without approval of Congress,35 or 
through "congressional-executive agreements," which the President en-
ters into only after Congress has passed a statute granting him au-
thority to do so.36 These statutory authorizations, however, are often 
vague, both in the particular terms of the agreement and in the parties 
with whom the President is authorized to make the agreement. Such a 
broad grant of power vests the President with significant unilateral au-
thority even under the moniker of a "congressional-executive agree-
ment."37 Again, because the stakes of diplomatic alliances are ex-
tremely high in today's multipolar world, this diplomatic authority can 
amount to a massive amount of presidential power. 
Given these expanded powers, there is a deep risk that Presidents 
may, in the interim between the exercise of power and the ex post 
check, work grave harm - to peace, to civil liberties, and to the image 
of the United States abroad. Goldsmith argues that the existence of ex 
post checks places all modern Presidents in a "synopticon" that pro-
duces a deterrent effect (p. 207). "[O]fficials are much more careful 
merely by virtue of being watched," Goldsmith notes (p. 207). Howev-
er, a crucial check on presidential adventurism - reelection - has 
been nonexistent for second-term Presidents since I 95 I. 38 This struc-
tural change may hide the Executive from the synopticon 's watchful 
eyes, making presidential decisionmaking freer of checks and balances 
than it otherwise might be in a system that properly relies on Madiso-
nian power sharing. And, as Goldsmith himself acknowledges, presi-
dential popularity can often blunt the power of the synopticon - par-
ticularly when national security is pitted against civil liberties (p. 4 7 ). 
The popular willingness to err on the side of national security, and the 
consequent weakness of the synopticon, will be at its apex when the 
issue involves the rights of foreigners - who altogether lack the abili-
33 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Af-
fairs, III YALE L.J. 231,237 (2001). 
34 Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, II9 
YALE L.J. 140, 144 (2009). 
35 These agreements become binding upon signatures of the representatives of both countries, 
and Congress may not become aware of these agreements until well after they become binding. 
!d. at rso. 
36 /d. at rs6. 
37 Even if Congress did seek to invalidate a congressional-executive agreement by statute, 
such an attempt would be unlikely to survive the President's veto. /d. at r67. 
38 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § r. 
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ty to vote.39 Yet the rights of foreigners are a crucial part of the post-
gil 1 debate. 
Goldsmith continues on to argue, however, that some of these new 
checks can ultimately constrain a President. But these checks are un-
predictable by their nature and risk being overreactive. It matters 
tremendously who does the checking - the public due to a leak to the 
media, a congressional committee, or a court. If it is a court, the con-
straint may last for decades, even when it is wrong, due to stare deci-
sis. If it is a leak, then it relies on a government official to break her 
oath of confidentiality, which can have pernicious consequences for 
government functioning. Ultimately, there is no way to know if, how, 
or when Goldsmith's different, newfangled checks will operate. 
Goldsmith's thesis is reminiscent of chemistry and stochastic diffu-
sion - the general rule that particles will move from areas of high 
concentration to areas of low concentration, eventually arriving at a 
random but uniform distribution. The path each individual particle 
takes can only be predicted in probabilistic terms. And so even though 
each individual particle's movement cannot be definitively determined, 
the net flow of all particles can be. 40 
In Goldsmith's formulation of the new checks and balances, the 
end result - some level of executive constraint - can be determined, 
but the manner in which all the individual pieces will move cannot be 
predicted. Too much movement in one sector of the new checks and 
balances can be compensated for with too little movement in anoth-
er - but some predictable end point can be achieved from this uneven 
process. However, unlike in chemistry, when dealing in the high-
stakes game of executive power, the end point - executive con-
straint - is by no means the only measure by which to evaluate suc-
cess. The process of how the check takes place matters tremendously. 
That is particularly so in the drama of wartime, when the process em-
ployed may alter the end result. Goldsmith rightly notes that in the 
immediate wake of a crisis, the nation will be anxious for action and 
forgiving of- even eager for- broad executive power. But this zeal 
for action in the heat of crisis will give way to speculation and skeptic-
ism as the broad policies become further and further removed from the 
cns1s. Good reporting and media investigation do create an ex post 
check, but it is a zigzag one that is ad hoc, reactive, and necessarily 
39 See generally Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (2007) 
(explaining why accountability mechanisms do not work as well when government singles out 
noncitizens in counterterrorism policy). 
40 The description of stochastic diffusion in this paragraph is drawn from the description of 
diffusive motion in Elmer M. Tory, Stochastic Sedimentation and Hydrodynamic Diffusion, 8o 
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING J. 81, 81 (2000). 
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less comprehensive than lacing constraints into the system from the 
start. 
In this way, the ex post action that characterizes the media's ability 
to constrain the executive branch exemplifies the larger problem of re-
lying on extragovernmental actors in Goldsmith's new system of 
checks and balances. Few can doubt Goldsmith's contention that 
"human rights activists and ... global media outlets" among other 
extragovernmental groups have seen their influence grow in recent 
decades (p. xv). And few can doubt the very real impact these extra-
governmental actors have had on post-9/r r executive power (p. xv). 
But like the courts and the general public, these groups are not nation-
al security experts privy to daily intelligence briefings and internal 
government deliberations. Instead, their access to information is dri-
ven by officials from within the government itself - rendering extra-
governmental actors almost entirely reactive, checking presidential au-
thority only after the President has chosen to move (and sometimes 
perhaps only after some collusion between a journalist and the gov-
ernment has transpired)Y For this reason, Goldsmith's reliance on 
these extragovernmental actors in his checks and balances system 
might be considered a "third-best" option for constraining executive 
power when other, better options exist.42 
The same thing is true, to some extent, for courts. Because of their 
aforementioned competence limitations, they will often stay on the 
sidelines of national security disputes. But when they do get involved, 
they may overreact in ways that could last for generations due to stare 
decisis. Here, the atmosphere of litigation can itself be part of the 
problem. Government lawyers come to court armed with the broadest 
arguments possible, and the Court's tendency is to push back against 
extreme claims. In this sense, the Guantanamo cases from 2004 
through 2008 may be seen as a reaction, indeed an overreaction, to the 
broad claims the Bush Administration put forth in the name of execu-
tive power. The Administration argued that the courts had no role 
whatsoever in reviewing the cases of the detainees43 and missed oppor-
4! See Arthur S. Brisbane, Pre-Publication Disclosure of Dowd Column: A Breach of Two 
Boundaries, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2012, 1:or PM), http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/o8 
/2 9/pre-pu blication-disclosure-of-dowd-column-a-breach-of-two-boundaries (describing one possi-
ble example of such collusion). 
42 See Katyal, supra note 21, at 2316 ("The first-best concept of 'legislature v. executive' 
checks and balances must be updated to contemplate second-best 'executive v. executive' divi-
sions."). 
43 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835-36 (Nov. 16, 2001) ("[Sec. 7(b)] With respect to any individual subject 
to this order - (1) military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by 
the individual; and (2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any 
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the indi-
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tunities to craft more modest arguments.44 By asserting that it had the 
ability to build an offshore facility to evade judicial review, to do what 
it wanted at that facility to detainees under the auspices of the 
commander-in-chief power, and to keep the entire process (including 
its legal opinions) secret, the executive branch provoked a judicial 
backlash. And while much of the Obama Administration's litigation 
strategy has been devoted to trying to restore credibility with the 
courts in the national security realm in the wake of Boumediene and 
Rasul v. Bush,45 that process has been extremely resource intensive 
and laborious - and there is no guarantee of a return to the pre-
Boumediene/Rasul era.46 The result may be to shackle Presidents in 
ways that can prove dangerous for national security. 
Goldsmith praises another form of check somewhat indigenous to 
Washington, D.C.: the well-placed source who leaks government se-
crets. That check, too, has tremendously pernicious consequences. 
Leaking weakens the Executive's ability to function even as it empow-
ers the press, and it sows distrust not only between the people and the 
government but also within the government itself, further reducing ef-
ficiency. Indeed, leaking as a check relies on disgruntled individuals 
who decide to disobey rules that they swore to uphold, and the leaks 
themselves may be incomplete or inconsistent. 47 One virtue served by 
the original, Madisonian conception of checks and balances is that it 
reduces the tendency to leak. Government servants may be substan-
tively opposed to particular policies, but so long as they have an op-
portunity to be heard and process is respected, they are unlikely to 
leak. Moreover, leaking as a check suffers from the same problem as 
the judicial check- it is far too haphazard a practice around which to 
build a constitutional system. 
In the end, there is a deep risk that Goldsmith's new constraints 
will not leave the presidency in quite the same place as would Madi-
sonian checks and balances. Sometimes, as with a popular President, 
the Executive may be constrained far less than in a Madisonian sys-
tem. And sometimes, the President may be constrained too much, for 
vidual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any for-
eign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal."). 
44 See Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases, 2003-
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49, 68. 
45 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
46 See supra p. 995· 
47 Consider the remarks by Justice Scalia, in response to a question from CNN host Piers 
Morgan, on leaks from the Supreme Court: "You should not believe what you read about the 
court in the newspapers. It's either been made up or been given to the newspapers by somebody 
who's violating a confidence, which means that person is i10t reliable." Adam Liptak, Scalia Says 
He Had No 'Falling Out' with Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A21 (quoting Justice 
Scalia) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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when Presidents overreach, there is always the risk of a corresponding 
overreaction by the other branches and the public. What is more, the 
multiple different actors that might engage in Goldsmith's checking 
function (and the many possible permutations of actors that might 
work together) make the ultimate result - and the process used to get 
there (which will often impact that result) - unpredictable. Such an 
overreaction may push policy further back, to a place more con-
strained than what is optimal. By acting too hastily or too indepen-
dently and by relying on Goldsmith's new mechanisms of constraint, 
the Executive may end up with less power than it truly needs. 
II. THE CYCLE OF PERMISSION AND CONSTRAINT 
Goldsmith's account of the post-g!I I era identifies what amounts to 
a three-stage cycle. The first is obvious: the attacks on the Pentagon 
and the World Trade Center. In the second stage, between 200I and 
2003, the Executive took unilateral action on torture, surveillance, mil-
itary commissions, and the like. In the third stage, between 2003 and 
2009, judicial, congressional, and media counterreaction took place. In 
his afterword, Goldsmith argues that the cycle of crisis, unilateral ex-
ecutive action, and governmental and extragovernmental reaction is 
likely to repeat following the next attack (pp. 244-52). 
At one level of abstraction, like many a Hegelian dialectic (or for-
tune cookie), this claim is undoubtedly true. In the wake of Lincoln's 
exercise of executive powers during the Civil War, "Congress reas-
serted itself with a vengeance and ran roughshod over" Andrew John-
son and his successors (p. 3I). In the wake of Wilson's exercise of ex-
ecutive power, the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles (p. 3 I). 
After Franklin D. Roosevelt's four terms, Congress supported the 
1\venty-Second Amendment (pp. 3I-32). And after Congress ceded 
power to the Executive to fight the Cold War, the disasters of Vietnam 
and Watergate reduced trust in the presidency to perhaps a record low 
(p. 34). But the hard question is whether this cycle is not just likely to, 
but must inexorably, repeat itself next time. In perhaps the book's on-
ly serious shortcoming, Goldsmith does not tell us what to do to try to 
stop it. 
And yet there are strong reasons to try. The harm from unilateral 
action in the interim will be great - harm to individuals, civil liber-
ties, and the global reputation of the United States. Goldsmith tells us 
a lot about the reforms undertaken during moments of relative calm. 
He identifies several mechanisms Congress has established and the 
Executive has self-imposed to check military wartime activities. Co-
vert actions must be approved via formal findings, congressional intel-
ligence committees must be informed of all intelligence activities, de-
tention now involves extensive paperwork and legalistic standards, 
and inspectors general conduct reviews of CIA activities (pp. 87-88, 
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99, ISS). Goldsmith describes the exponential increase in the number 
of lawyers employed by the executive and military departments as a 
significant check on executive discretion (pp. I2S-3S). These mecha-
nisms not only lead to increased reporting but also provide a deterrent 
effect - the presidential synopticon described by Goldsmith and men-
tioned earlier in this Review - inducing executive branch officials to 
second-guess themselves before undertaking decisions that they will 
soon have to explain to Congress and other bodies. 
These existing mechanisms work well now, in a time of relative 
calm. But if another grave threat to national security emerges, as it 
undoubtedly will, there is no guarantee that these accountability pro-
grams will be left in place and will work. Indeed, Goldsmith himself 
suggests that they will not.48 The suspension of these checks and the 
resulting increase in executive power would mean the cycle will repeat 
itself, for to reinstate those same checks we would have to relitigate, 
repass, or rescind legislation, and rely once again on the press and 
courts to uncover abuse of this broad power. Given Goldsmith's prog-
nosis, it is worth thinking now about ways to try to lace an under-
standing of Goldsmith's cycle into legislative and judicial decisionmak-
ing in times of crisis, in order to catalyze the start of stage three and 
allow a quick exit from stage two's unilateral regime. 
There are a number of different strategies that could break the 
cycle. Professor Bruce Ackerman has suggested a fairly detailed one.49 
48 In his afterword, Goldsmith outlines a likely unfolding of events after the next attack: First, 
recriminations will be made against the President for failing to stop the attack, regardless of what 
steps his Administration took. Second, accountability mechanisms will be blamed for the attack, 
and intelligence officials will be accused of placing a thumb on the scale for civil liberties· in the 
trade-off between liberty and security. Third, officials will recommend granting the President 
increased legal authority to combat terrorism. Then, there will be a reawakening of, and in-
creased vigor within, those much-criticized accountability mechanisms (pp. 248-5 r). 
49 Ackerman proposes a set of emergency procedures in which the Executive is granted broad 
powers to provide relief from the immediate attack and pursue prevention for the next one. Ack-
erman presents these procedures as a "tragic compromise": civil liberties are relinquished for the 
promise of supermajorities, compensation, and decency. Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency 
Constitution, r 13 YALE L.J. 1029, 1077 (2004). The Executive is granted emergency powers for a 
limited amount of time; to extend these powers, an increasing percentage of Congress must ap-
prove the extension. The longer the emergency, the greater the supermajority necessary to main-
tain emergency status. !d. at 1047-48. Compensation would be awarded to victims of the attack 
as well as persons wrongly detained as terror suspects. I d. at ro62-66. And though the Executive 
has plenary powers in detention, decency in treatment should be the standard for judicial review 
of detention procedures. !d. at 1071-72. There are any number of criticisms of Ackerman's pro-
posal. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Constitution as Black Box During National Emergencies: 
Comment on Bruce Ackerman's Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of 
Terrorism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 597-601 (2oo6); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, 
The Anti-Emergency Constitution, rr3 YALE L.]. 1801, 1823-30 (2004); David Cole, In Case of 
Emergency, N.Y. REV. BOOKS Guly 13, 2006), http:l/www.nybooks.com/articles/archiveshoo6/jul 
lr3/in-case-of-emergency/?pagination=false. But the proposal is nonetheless the type of thinking 
that could help break Goldsmith's cycle and deserves attention. 
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And there are more modest strategies worth considering as well. One 
need not go far to find them. As an exemplar, take one of the most 
significant post-g/II pieces of legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act.50 
Outside of a brief mention (p. 183), Goldsmith does not analyze the 
virtues of this Act in his book. We all know that the USA PATRIOT 
Act revamped national security law in realms such as electronic intelli-
gence collection. But less appreciated is its sunset provision. Instead 
of leaving the law on the books for all time, the drafters provided that 
if, in four years, no legislative action were taken to renew the Act, 
many parts of it would expire. Included in the sunset clause were 
many of the law's most important provisions, such as those that gov-
erned the authority to intercept wire communications relating to ter-
rorism, liberalized the sharing of intelligence information within the 
U.S. government, authorized roving surveillance, permitted the gov-
ernment to engage in broad third-party searches for records, and au-
thorized the seizure of voice mail. 51 
The USA PATRIOT Act's sunset provision was applauded across 
the aisle as a way to avoid overreaction. Republican House Majority 
Leader Dick Armey explained that "[t]hese tools give the government 
much increased capability to do surveillance on American citizens,"52 
but that "the sunset is a very important matter with a lot of our mem-
bers"53 because it affords an opportunity to "see how well [the Act's 
provisions] work, how effective they've been, and how responsibly 
these tools have been used. Our rights as citizens are a big part of 
what we're fighting for."54 Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy pro-
posed expanding the sunset provisions even further, arguing that they 
so Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). Goldsmith discusses the sunset pro-
vision briefly in supporting his claim that Congress's grant of power to the President was narrow-
er than many recognize: "Even the controversial provisions of the PATRIOT Act, enacted in Oc-
tober 2001, contained an unusual restraint. The original law had a sunset clause that terminated 
the law's most controversial provisions after a few years, thus requiring the President to remake 
the case to Congress that the provisions were still justified, and requiring Congress to consider 
new evidence before authorizing it again if Congress deemed appropriate" (p. 183) (endnote 
omitted). 
51 See USA PATRIOT Act§ 224, 115 Stat. at 295. 
52 Karen Hosler, Bills Would Give Ashcroft Many Anti-Terrorism Tools, BALT. SUN, Oct. 10, 
2001, at 7A (quoting Rep. Dick Armey) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 I d. (quoting Rep. Dick Armey) (internal quotation mark omitted) ("[Rep. Armey] estimated 
that much of the House support for the measure was based on [the] principle [of sunsetting]."); see 
also Nat Hentoff, Terrorizing the Bill of Rights, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20, 2001, at 32 ("[Senator 
Paul] Wellstone, while troubled by the bill, felt reassured because of its 'sunset' provi-
sion .... [Senator Wellstone stated]: 'It is critically important that each and every one, every sen-
ator and representative, monitor the use of new authorities provided to the law enforcement 
agents to conduct surveillance. We're going to have to monitor this very closely.'"). 
54 Hosler, supra note 52 (quoting Rep. Dick Armey) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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permitted review and reconsideration of these grants of power to law 
enforcement before they are "etched into stone."55 
A sunset provision can help bring the legislature out of Goldsmith's 
stage two and toward stage three. The USA PATRIOT Act provision 
forced a future conversation about the effectiveness and desirability of 
the powers the Act granted and made legislators evaluate whether they 
had overreacted in the heat of crisis. A similar provision was put into 
the statute creating the Independent Counsel,56 which contained a sim-
ilar potential for overreaction post-Watergate,57 and Congress even-
tually did allow the office of Independent Counsel to lapse. 58 Indeed, 
when states have adopted sunset provisions, the upshot has been dra-
matic change and innovation: one in five agencies that are reviewed 
under sunsets are terminated, one in three are modified, and "less than 
half" of such agencies are "re-created with little or no change."59 Par-
ticularly in the national security realm, a sunset helps minimize 
the cost of a legislative overreaction by ensuring future debate and 
reconsideration. 
What works for the legislature might work for the other two 
branches as well. If Presidents are particularly prone to unilateralism 
55 I49 CONG. REC. 23,784 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) ("With the PATRIOT Act, 
Congress provided government investigators with a virtual smorgasbord of new powers from 
which to choose .... Have we provided too many choices and too much power to a limited few? 
These are questions that require answers before the more far-reaching provisions of PATRIOT 
are etched into stone."). Similar arguments have been voiced in favor of state sunset provisions. 
See, e.g., MARCY STEPHENS, THE STATUS OF SUNSET IN THE STATES 3 (I982) ("The auto-
matic termination provision is an action-forcing mechanism to require state legislators to conduct 
serious program evaluation."); DOUG ROEDERER & PATSY PALMER, SUNSET: EXPECTATION 
AND EXPERIENCE I3 (I98I) (suggesting a similar point). 
56 Ethics in Government Act of I978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, § 598, 92 Stat. I824, I873 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2006)). 
57 See S. REP. No. 95-170, at 76-77 (I978). The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
noted: 
Section 598 is a sunset provision which states that all of the provisions of the new Chap-
ter 39 ... will cease to have effect five years after the date on which it takes ef-
fect .... Five years is a reasonable period to permit the provisions of this chapter to op-
erate and then to review those provisions to see if too many or too few special 
prosecutors have been appointed, to determine whether there is a need for a revision of 
the standards defining when a conflict of interest exists, or to determine if there is a need 
to revise the method of appointment, the method of removal, or any other significant 
portion of this chapter. 
/d.; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-I307, at I I (I978) ("Section 598, 'Termination of effect of chapter,' 
is in essence a sunset provision for the special prosecutor mechanism .... The purpose of this pro-
vision is to enable the Congress to review how the legislation has operated in order to determine 
whether the mechanism should be retained or changed."). 
58 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. pt. 6oo (2ou). 
59 MARK R. DANIELS, TERMINATING PUBLIC PROGRAMS 34 (I997). For an extensive 
summary of state sunset provisions, see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON THE LEGIS. PROCESS, H. 
COMM. ON RULES, 97TH CONG., A COMPILATION OF STATE SUNSET STATUTES (Comm. 
Print I98I). 
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at the outset of a crisis, a good default rule may be to insist that all 
major executive and military orders have a three- or five-year sunset 
provision. Further advantage might be obtained from a congressional 
reporting requirement, which would require the President to, at some 
point in the future, justify each decision affirmatively, hopefully after 
the crisis has abated and more data points from which to evaluate the 
policy have been accumulated. The result may be to curtail some of 
the excesses of presidential unilateralism during the reconsideration 
phase, as well as perhaps to restrict some of that unilateralism in the 
first place. A President who knows that a successor will have to af-
firmatively evaluate one of his policies may be somewhat more cau-
tious than one who does not. While this effect is likely to be modest, 60 
the point is simply that while Goldsmith takes the harm of his cyclical 
reaction and counterreaction as a given, there are a variety of institu-
tional mechanisms such as sunset provisions that may minimize those 
harms. 
Even more promising than executive sunsets, though far less intui-
tive, are sunsets for judicial opinions. They would ensure that the 
precedents set at the outset of a military conflict would not necessarily 
be binding in the future. Right now, national security litigation has 
the odd quirk of being governed by a set of patchwork rules developed 
in 1942 (Ex parte Quirin61 ), 1868 (Ex parte McCardle 62 ), and at other 
times during or shortly after national emergencies. It is not at all ob-
vious that those rules should control judicial decisionmaking today. 
After all, there are serious risks that some of those opinions (such as 
Korematsu and Quirin) may have lurched too far toward enlarging 
presidential power in th~ midst of a national security emergency 
(Goldsmith's stage one). And there are also risks that sometimes the 
Supreme Court has overreacted and has gone too far in the other di-
rection when carrying out Goldsmith's stage three checks (for example, 
Boumediene, which constitutionalized military detention policy63 in 
the wake of particular scandals such as Abu Ghraib). And when the 
courts overreact, it is difficult for a new test case to develop. Many 
60 There are reasons to believe that sometimes such sunsets might embolden, rather than re-
strain, executives. Presidents could point to the sunset as an illustration of their bona fides and 
sell their policies (to themselves and their staffs, as well as to the public if the matter is public) as 
ones born in restraint due to their temporary natures. Statutes with sunset provisions have an 
experimental character, and so the concern is not an unreasonable one. On the other hand, Presi-
dents are often concerned with protecting their legacies, and adopting positions that they know a 
successor will have to affirmatively reevaluate is probably more likely to encourage ex ante re-
straint rather than adventurism. 
6! 317 U.S. I (1942). 
62 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) so6 (r868). 
63 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271-74 (2008) (holding that statutory review 
procedures for Guantanamo Bay inmates were constitutionally inadequate). 
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executives will be poised to follow the law as laid down by the Su-
preme Court, rather than to challenge it. 
Here, one can take a lesson from Justice O'Connor's opinion for 
the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger.64 In that case, Justice O'Connor 
stated: "We expect that 2 5 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."65 
This statement might be thought of as a judicial sunset: she was wor-
ried about a holding by the Court that would prevent affirmative ac-
tion policies at universities from being contested in perpetuity. It was 
also a signal to universities and litigants to be on notice that a test case 
could develop in the future. 
The tendency toward judicial under- and overreaction in national 
security cases can be muted by adopting the Grutter approach and 
fashioning a judicial sunset. The Court could decide a case but affir-
matively state that its holding would be binding and entitled to the full 
power of the stare decisis doctrine for only a set number of years, or 
announce that the holding would be binding law until the occurrence 
of a designated event (for example, "Following the cessation of hostili-
ties with Japan and Germany, we will be completely open to reconsi-
deration."). After the elapse of that time period, both lower courts and 
the Supreme Court would not be bound by the decision, though they 
could of course follow its reasoning and logic. In effect, the decision 
would become something akin to an out-of-circuit precedent for a fed-
eral court of appeals, in that it would have no formal binding weight 
as law, but its reasoning could be cited as persuasive authority via an 
affirmative codification of the old decision.66 And the President him-
self could decide to act in defiance of such precedents- but would ul-
timately have to win the matter in court. 
Sunsetting judicial decisions would allow an easier escape from de-
cisions made in a crisis. The judicial sunset allows government to ap-
proach new problems unhampered by old decisions yet informed by 
them. It may often be prudent, as the USA PATRIOT Act authors 
realized, for legislators to reconsider their premises after the space of a 
few years; and a similar point goes for courts, too. Institutional mech-
anisms that take the likelihood of under- and overreaction seriously, 
and that attempt to minimize the long-term impacts of under- and 
overreaction, can make the cycles of permission and restraint that 
Goldsmith identifies less pernicious. 
64 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
65 I d. at 343· 
66 For a fuller explication, see Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1237 (2004). 
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CONCLUSION 
Process matters. Jack Goldsmith has constructed a valiant argu-
ment for why we should not be quite so worried about presidential un-
ilateralism by pointing to all sorts of new checks, such as the media. 
But in the end, these are a poor man's substitute for the real thing. 
Our framers envisioned a far more robust set of active interlocking 
governmental institutions where Presidents were constrained at the 
outset instead of down the road, years later, after much harm had al-
ready been done. The type of ex post constraints Goldsmith identifies 
will not work or, perhaps even worse, will work too well. At the same 
time, Goldsmith is absolutely right to observe that a time of crisis is 
not the easiest time to assert checks and balances against the Presi-
dent. Armed with that knowledge, it would be wise to start develop-
ing mechanisms and crafting policy now to minimize the harms 
created by presidential unilateralism and the inevitable legislative, 
judicial, and media under- and overreaction when the next crisis 
occurs. 
